At the time of the war in Kargil, I used to live pretty close to the border. we would hear IAF jets frequently. We would hear snippets of the bravery of our boys on the border and my eyes would well up. The stories or the Pakistani bastardy used to light a fire under me. Years later, reading non Indian accounts of the war, I realized how brave and accomplished our forces are. The war in Kargil became a text book example of High Altitude Warfare (till then it was the battle in Greece in WWII). The following is a thesis for MS by then Capt. Marcus Acosta which he wrote as part of his post graduate program at the US Naval Postgraduate School. It is a long document but well worth the effort.
HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT
AND THE FUTURE
by
Marcus P. Acosta
The Indian military rushed forces to the region once it finally realized the scope of Pakistan’s incursion. By the end of May 1999, the Indian Army had amassed a force of nineteen infantry battalions and several artillery regiments in the Kargil sector. Array of Forces During the Kargil Conflict).13 Initial offensive operations
failed despite an overwhelming force advantage. Indian planners underestimated the size and tenacity of their foe, and poorly planned assaults produced staggering casualties. Soldiers involved in the initial actions were neither equipped nor prepared for high altitude combat. Battalions launched uphill assaults without sufficient artillery and close air support. Indian infantrymen advanced up steep gradients. Assaults faded as men succumbed to exhaustion and enemy fire. The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) efforts, Operation Safed Sagar (White Sea),produced mixed results. Thin air diminished weapon accuracy and hindered aircraft performance. Adverse weather and the heightened SAM threat hampered the IAF’s attempts at close air support (CAS). Aircraft proved unreliable in rapidly changing weather, and a lack of pilot training for CAS in the mountains further diminished the IAF’s ability to provide firepower in coordination with ground maneuver. The IAF eventually adapted and enjoyed some success, primarily against fixed targets. The introduction of laser-guided munitions (LGM) increased accuracy and contributed to the fight on Tiger Hill. IAF pressure on NLI soldiers had a significant psychological effect. Unconventional techniques, such as using aerial munitions to create avalanches over trails, isolated Pakistani defensive positions and destroyed supply sites.The Indian Army modified its offensive tactics and exploited NLI errors. Massive artillery barrages preceded infantry assaults. Suppressive fire, provided primarily by artillery and mortars, set the conditions for successful attacks. Battalions advanced along the most inaccessible routes. Daring maneuver along a difficult axis of attack created the crucial element of surprise. Indian soldiers climbed vertical cliffs throughout the night, attacking the Pakistani positions at dawn. Once at the objective, victory depended on combat at close quarters. The Indian armed forces prevailed, driving the NLI from all of its positions by the
end of July.
The entire thesis can be read at:
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/acosta03.pdf
HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT
AND THE FUTURE
by
Marcus P. Acosta
The Indian military rushed forces to the region once it finally realized the scope of Pakistan’s incursion. By the end of May 1999, the Indian Army had amassed a force of nineteen infantry battalions and several artillery regiments in the Kargil sector. Array of Forces During the Kargil Conflict).13 Initial offensive operations
failed despite an overwhelming force advantage. Indian planners underestimated the size and tenacity of their foe, and poorly planned assaults produced staggering casualties. Soldiers involved in the initial actions were neither equipped nor prepared for high altitude combat. Battalions launched uphill assaults without sufficient artillery and close air support. Indian infantrymen advanced up steep gradients. Assaults faded as men succumbed to exhaustion and enemy fire. The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) efforts, Operation Safed Sagar (White Sea),produced mixed results. Thin air diminished weapon accuracy and hindered aircraft performance. Adverse weather and the heightened SAM threat hampered the IAF’s attempts at close air support (CAS). Aircraft proved unreliable in rapidly changing weather, and a lack of pilot training for CAS in the mountains further diminished the IAF’s ability to provide firepower in coordination with ground maneuver. The IAF eventually adapted and enjoyed some success, primarily against fixed targets. The introduction of laser-guided munitions (LGM) increased accuracy and contributed to the fight on Tiger Hill. IAF pressure on NLI soldiers had a significant psychological effect. Unconventional techniques, such as using aerial munitions to create avalanches over trails, isolated Pakistani defensive positions and destroyed supply sites.The Indian Army modified its offensive tactics and exploited NLI errors. Massive artillery barrages preceded infantry assaults. Suppressive fire, provided primarily by artillery and mortars, set the conditions for successful attacks. Battalions advanced along the most inaccessible routes. Daring maneuver along a difficult axis of attack created the crucial element of surprise. Indian soldiers climbed vertical cliffs throughout the night, attacking the Pakistani positions at dawn. Once at the objective, victory depended on combat at close quarters. The Indian armed forces prevailed, driving the NLI from all of its positions by the
end of July.
The entire thesis can be read at:
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/theses/acosta03.pdf
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