On this blog, we normally talk about the "aam aadmi" issues. So at a cursory glance, the following may feel like a primer on regional politics. However, when read carefully, one realizes that Pakistan has been a Chinese tool to keep India down. Pakistanis are only too willing to oblige because of their intense hatred for all things India. The following article claims that the Chinese are "encouraging" the anti Indian activities in J&K to keep a large section of Indian army pinned down and to keep us on a slow bleed.
What can we do? For once, stop buying anything with "Made in China written on it. I am sure that equivalent Indian stuff is also available. That is the only thing that the aam aadmi can do especially in light of our cowardly and ineffective foreign policy.
China’s Caution on Afghanistan—Pakistan
"On the other flank is India. The Pakistan ‘‘hedge’’ is a longstanding one for China, but recent developments have, if anything, given it renewed importance. Despite significantly expanding economic ties with India, Beijing’s aspirations in recent years to move toward a more balanced policy have faltered as Sino-Indian relations have resumed their familiar pattern of strategic rivalry,17 most clearly manifested in the flare-up of border disputes that have remained unresolved since the 1962 war.18 The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, the overall strengthening relationship with the United States under the Bush administration, and the booming Indian economy have resulted in a resumed concern to pin India down in South Asia, rather than allow it to develop as a regional rival. As the Indian economy continues to
outpace Pakistan’s by a substantial increment, any thought in Beijing of achieving a comprehensive South Asian balance of power is long gone, and there is little prospect of China shepherding a Pakistani nuclear deal through the Nuclear Suppliers Group. But the promise of a tit-for-tat expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear power capabilities through the Chashma III and IV plants looks set to be realized.19 The willingness to augment Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities also persists with China’s full spectrum support to air, land, missile, and naval forces alongside tacit support for the jihadi strategy that helps to bind half a million Indian troops in Kashmir. China has provided direct protection to these militant groups at the UN Security Council’s 1267 committee, blocking efforts to sanction Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] alias) until political pressure on Pakistan escalated after the LeT involvement in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. This entire strand of China’s thinking, which requires a state of managed tension in the region, cuts directly against the U.S.
efforts to dissuade Pakistan from its India-centric military strategy. The depth of China’s relationship with Pakistan is also a forceful barrier to efforts that include Beijing more seriously in multilateral groupings, such as Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP), a multi-country initiative launched in 2008 to provide donor and broader development support for the new Pakistani government.20 China is ordinarily reluctant to multilateralize its relationships and aid efforts anyway, but it is particularly reluctant to treat its closest partner as a joint ‘‘problem’’ to be addressed with other countries. ‘‘We don’t want to be seen by our Pakistani friends as engaging in G-2 management,’’ as one Chinese analyst put it.21 While China still attends the FoDP meetings, Beijing routinely sends relatively junior officials."
http://twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_Small.pdf
What can we do? For once, stop buying anything with "Made in China written on it. I am sure that equivalent Indian stuff is also available. That is the only thing that the aam aadmi can do especially in light of our cowardly and ineffective foreign policy.
China’s Caution on Afghanistan—Pakistan
"On the other flank is India. The Pakistan ‘‘hedge’’ is a longstanding one for China, but recent developments have, if anything, given it renewed importance. Despite significantly expanding economic ties with India, Beijing’s aspirations in recent years to move toward a more balanced policy have faltered as Sino-Indian relations have resumed their familiar pattern of strategic rivalry,17 most clearly manifested in the flare-up of border disputes that have remained unresolved since the 1962 war.18 The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, the overall strengthening relationship with the United States under the Bush administration, and the booming Indian economy have resulted in a resumed concern to pin India down in South Asia, rather than allow it to develop as a regional rival. As the Indian economy continues to
outpace Pakistan’s by a substantial increment, any thought in Beijing of achieving a comprehensive South Asian balance of power is long gone, and there is little prospect of China shepherding a Pakistani nuclear deal through the Nuclear Suppliers Group. But the promise of a tit-for-tat expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear power capabilities through the Chashma III and IV plants looks set to be realized.19 The willingness to augment Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities also persists with China’s full spectrum support to air, land, missile, and naval forces alongside tacit support for the jihadi strategy that helps to bind half a million Indian troops in Kashmir. China has provided direct protection to these militant groups at the UN Security Council’s 1267 committee, blocking efforts to sanction Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] alias) until political pressure on Pakistan escalated after the LeT involvement in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. This entire strand of China’s thinking, which requires a state of managed tension in the region, cuts directly against the U.S.
efforts to dissuade Pakistan from its India-centric military strategy. The depth of China’s relationship with Pakistan is also a forceful barrier to efforts that include Beijing more seriously in multilateral groupings, such as Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP), a multi-country initiative launched in 2008 to provide donor and broader development support for the new Pakistani government.20 China is ordinarily reluctant to multilateralize its relationships and aid efforts anyway, but it is particularly reluctant to treat its closest partner as a joint ‘‘problem’’ to be addressed with other countries. ‘‘We don’t want to be seen by our Pakistani friends as engaging in G-2 management,’’ as one Chinese analyst put it.21 While China still attends the FoDP meetings, Beijing routinely sends relatively junior officials."
http://twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_Small.pdf
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